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I.  

INTRODUCTION

The debate in law around the moment that legal
personhood comes into being within a legal order strongly
impacts the enjoyment of reproductive and sexual rights of
individuals in Latin America. In the courts, for example, this
debate, has translated into limits on the exercise of
emergency contraception by women or couples, and
consequently defining the scope of sexual rights.1 Similarly,
the debate has propelled civil society organizations, such as
religious or conservative groups and human rights NGOs, to
advocate for a specific determination of when legal
personhood begins and what its effects should be on certain
practices such as emergency contraception or assisted
reproductive techniques.2 Furthermore, such debates have
exposed the disagreements around regulation of this issue
between state branches of power in different Latin American
countries.3
	
  
	
  
Martín Hevia, The Legal Status of Emergency Contraception in Latin
America, 116 INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 87 (2012).
2 See, e.g., Aníbal Faúndes, Luis Távara, Vivian Brache, & Frank Alvarez,
Emergency Contraception under Attack in Latin America: Response of the
Medical Establishment and Civil Society, 15(29) REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
MATTERS 130 (2007); Fernando Muñoz León, Morning After Decisions:
Legal Mobilization Against Emergency Contraception in Chile, 21 MICH. J. OF
GENDER & L. 123 (2014).
3 E.g., Executive Order No. 27913-S [Costa Rica Executive] [Ministry of
Health], 111 Gaztt. Jun. 9, 1999; Executive Order no. 24029-S [Costa Rica
Executive] [Ministry of Health], 45 Gaztt. Mar. 3, 1995; Corte Suprema de
la Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica] [Constitutional
Chamber], Mar. 15, 2000, Sentencia 2000-02306, Exp. 95-001734-0007-CO
(the executive orders and the Supreme Court judgment show the
1
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A salient element of these debates is that all the parties,
on either side of the ideological spectrum, have structured
their claims around a global language that is, to a great
extent, entrenched in contemporary polities: the language of
(human) rights.4 The American States, with important
exceptions, have entered into a transnational understanding
comparable to a lingua franca of human rights adopted as
the American Convention on Human Rights.5 Because all of
the State Parties agree to abide and govern through this
language of rights within the system, individuals from these
American States have discovered an institutional opening
for raising rights claims in the state or even international
institutions.6 Notwithstanding this, the use of this language
does not amount to a global language of understanding, but
rather it offers individuals a vocabulary “to get in the door
and then speak[] instrumentally or ethically.”7
With a basis in this instrument, the language of rights
applied to reproductive health has given place to different
dialects framed on ontological or metaphysical perspectives,
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
disagreement between the different branches on when legal personhood
begins, and hence legal protections and effects on the legal regime of
assisted human reproduction. In the case of Costa Rica, while the
Executive regulated in vitro fertilization, the Supreme Court judged that
the permissibility of this treatment violated the right to life of embryos.).
4 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, RELIGION AND RATIONALITY: ESSAYS ON REASON,
GOD, AND MODERNITY 153-54 (Eduardo Mendieta ed., 1st ed. 2002).
5 American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter American Convention] (the important
exceptions refer to Canada and the United States, stating that while both
countries are part of the Organization of the American States, neither has
ratified the American Convention).
6 David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 103 (2002).
7 Id.
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which have, in turn, structured the debate on when life
begins, generally, in absolute terms. For instance, human
embryos have been described as full legal persons entitled to
rights, and consequently, legislatures and courts have
awarded them full protection of the law, disregarding
women’s reproductive health rights or minority rights.8
Conversely, (and simultaneously), these embryos have also
been conceptualized, under such dialects, as mere organisms
with potential legal claims and no recognized rights at all.9
The disagreements around the articulation of these
dialects, which are constructed on the basis of the language
of human rights, depict a cultural or moral reading of the
rights being championed or a moral reading evaluating what
should not be considered valuable.10 In this sense, there are
groups that advocate an absolute right to life under a
metaphysical or teleological conceptualization.11 Similarly,
there are other groups that advocate, under liberal
foundations, that the right to life cannot be recognized
whatsoever or, if recognized, it should not enjoy a protection
	
  
	
  
For instance, that has been the case in Mexico, where some State
constitutions have recently been amended so as to recognize a right to
life from conception. See Contitución Política del Estado Libre y
Soberano de Baja California [C.P.B.J.], as amended, art. 7, Periódico
Oficial [DO], 21 de Marzo de 2014 (Mex.).
9 See S.T.F. Petition No. 3510, Relator: Carlos Ayres Brito, 29.05.2008, 96,
Diário Da Justiça [D.J.], 28.05.2010, 134 (Braz.) (on the constitutionality of
the Biosecurity Act, where the Supreme Court recognizes no rights to
embryos.).
10 See, e.g., Jorge Contesse, Universally Speaking? The Cultural Challenge to
Rights and Constitutionalism, 77 REVISTA JURÍDICIA U.P.R. 267 (2008).
11 See, e.g., Ligia M. de Jesús, Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica: The InterAmerican Court on Human Rights’ Promotion of Non-existent Human Rights
Obligations to Authorize Artificial Reproductive Technologies, 18 UCLA J. OF
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 275 (2014).
8
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to the detriment of the enjoyment of rights of other affected
individuals.12
In 2012, as a way of deciding the fate of this debate in
the context of Costa Rica, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (IACtHR) identified that the employment of
these dialects had been governing this disagreement and
claimed the need for change.13 The IACtHR, analyzing how
to frame the discussion on when human life begins,
maintained the following:
Some of these opinions may be associated with
concepts that confer metaphysical attributes on
embryos. Such concepts cannot justify preference
being given to a certain type of scientific literature
when interpreting the scope of the right to life
established in the Convention, because this would
imply imposing specific types of beliefs on others
who do not share them.14
In its judgment, the IACtHR decided that a reasonable
interpretation on when life begins must not impose one
particular moral understanding of rights on everyone.15 On
	
  
	
  
See, e.g., Fernando Zegers-Hochschild, Bernard M. Dickens, & Sandra
Dughman-Manzur, Human Rights to In Vitro Fertilization, 123 INT’L J. OF
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 86, 88 (2013); Bernard Dickens & Rebecca
Cook, The Legal Status of Embryos, 111 INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY &
OBSTETRICS 91 (2010).
13 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 185 (Nov. 28, 2012)
[hereinafter Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica]. For a detailed
discussion of the case, see Martín Hevia & Carlos Herrera Vacaflor, From
Recognition to Regulation: Access to In Vitro Fertilization and the American
Convention on Human Rights, 25 FLA. J. OF INT’L L. 587 (2013).
14 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, ¶ 185.
15 Id. ¶ 191.
12
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the contrary, it should reconstruct the metaphysical or
ontological considerations about the controversy in a
systematic way, on the basis of the legal system to which
these conceptualizations belong.16 Furthermore, the IACtHR,
also speaking from the language of rights, maintains that
considerations of when human life begins, whichever dialect
they are based on, should “keep abreast of the passage of
time and current living conditions.”17 In the context of
assisted reproductive techniques, the IACtHR requires that
the narrative of reproductive health rights be spoken from
the language of rights (regardless of the dialect employed),
must not lose sight of the legal system to which they belong
(both the internal and international legal order), and needs
to address the current necessities and problems of
individuals.18
Intending to keep aloof of the theoretical reflections
around the use (or abuse) of the language of rights, this
article will draw on that language as a framework for
studying the recent developments of the debates around the
beginning of legal personhood and assisted reproductive
techniques (ARTs) in Argentina. Recently, the National
Congress of Argentina has approved the unification of the
National Civil Code with the National Commerce Code, a
legal reform that became operative in August of 2015.19 This
important legal reform entailed several changes to the
general principles of private law and family law. In fact, in
the congressional (and media) debates around the drafting
and approval of the reformed Code, the determination of
	
  
	
  
Id.
Id. ¶ 245.
18 Id. ¶ 191.
19 Law No. 26.994, Oct. 1, 2014, B.O. 32985 (Arg.).
16
17
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when legal personhood begins, and what are its effects for
the legal regime of ARTs have been among the issues that
provoked heated disagreements.20 What has been the object
of these debates around the beginning of legal personhood
and ARTs in the new Argentinean Civil Code? Did
Argentinean Representatives learn anything from the
experience of past debates in the region on how to regulate
the beginning of legal personhood and ART’s in a way that
respects and protects human rights of individuals? This
article will argue that the text of the new Civil and
Commerce Code failed to accommodate discourses about
when life begins under a reasonable lingua franca of human
rights. In light of that, we will propose a reading of the text
that is consistent with human rights case law.
For the purposes of presenting this argument, the
article will be organized as follows: Section II will first
present how the former civil code used to structure the
beginning of legal personhood, and the position adopted by
the drafters of the reform. This presentation will allow a
comparison of the courts’ understanding and conservative
actors’ use of the language of rights for structuring “when
life begins” in the Argentine legal tradition. Next, this
Article will discuss an explanation on how such
determination on the beginning of legal personhood framed
	
  
	
  
Other major disagreements include whether or not the Code should
rule on state responsibility – it doesn´t – and the legal status of contracts
concluded in a currency other than Argentine pesos. See, e.g., Martín
Hevia, Controversias del Nuevo Código Civil, CLARÍN (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://www.clarin.com/opinion/Codigo_Civil_y_Comercialresponsabilidad_del_Estado-fertilizaciondepositos_bancarios_0_1406859346.html; Martín Hevia, En Manos de la
Corte,
BASTIÓN
DIGITAL
(Aug.
19,
2015),
http://ar.bastiondigital.com/notas/en-manos-de-la-corte.
20
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the exercise of reproductive rights through, for instance,
assisted reproductive techniques. Lastly, this section will
conclude by showing that before the approval of the new
Civil and Commerce Code, there were two dialects of rights
governing the debate on when life begins.
Section III critically analyzes the outcome of such
debates at the National Congress on the reform of the Civil
Code. In this section, the article will discuss how the
beginning of legal personhood is prescribed in the current
Civil and Commerce Code and its effects on the legal regime
of ARTs. Furthermore, Section III will show the perils
entrenched in the language of the new articles, in that they
grant judges broad discretionary power for determining the
scope of each article’s mandate. In reaction to this, Section III
will present the jurisprudence of the IACtHR as a binding
doctrine for local judges when deciding the scope of
individual enjoyment of reproductive rights.
Section IV critiques the legislative decision to prescribe
a legal concept in private law such as the “beginning of
existence.”21 By contrast, this section proposes that any
legislative decision to prescribe a legal concept of this nature
within private law should specifically focus on when legal
personhood has legal effects in private law, and not extend
beyond this scope. In this case, the article will argue that
legal personhood should refer to when born human beings
become subjects of legal regulation and protection. Under
this thesis, a Civil and Commerce Code governing private
relations between individuals would not have to deal with
the recognition of rights to embryos and pronucleate
oocytes, or the evaluation of scientific data for determining
	
  
	
  
CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CÓD. PROC. Civ.
Y COM.] [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 19 (2012) (Arg.).
21
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when legal personhood commences. Rather, the thesis
maintained in Section IV would facilitate a better
understanding of the role of the articles prescribed in the
Civil and Commerce Code on the legal regime of ARTs in
Argentina, as well as the fulfillment of human rights
obligations assumed by the State to its individuals.
Finally, Section V summarizes the findings of the
article and presents a conclusion.
II.  

THE BEGINNING OF EXISTENCE: THE ROLE OF THIS
CONCEPT IN THE ARGENTINEAN FORMER CIVIL CODE
AND IN THE DRAFT OF THE NEW CIVIL AND
COMMERCE CODE

The legal issue of when legal personhood begins for the
purpose of private law (i.e. legal parenthood, assisted
reproductive techniques, or emergency contraception) has
been framed in Argentina’s former and current Civil Code as
“the beginning of existence.” 22 This section attempts to
disperse some of the haziness within the legal question of
“the beginning of existence” and focus on how judicial
interpretation of this issue in the former Civil Code initially
affected access to assisted reproductive techniques.
Furthermore, this section will draw attention to the core
developments propelled by a Commission of Jurists
regarding the “beginning of existence” in their draft to the
reform of the Civil and Commerce Code, as well as some
critiques to this draft expressed in the congressional debates
of the reform.
The analysis on “the beginning of existence” in
Argentina’s Civil Codes will proceed in two parts. First, this
	
  
	
  
22

Id.; CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 70 (1883) (Arg.).
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section will focus on what the former Civil Code (from 1869)
could have possibly imagined about assisted reproductive
techniques, and what, in fact, the courts interpreted the Civil
Code to say about embryos, rights, and assisted
reproductive techniques. This section will draw attention to
the fact that petitioners have framed their demands for the
regulation of and restrictions on access to ARTs under a
language of rights, but that are underpinned in a
metaphysical or ontological dialect; the courts have
conceded such demands.
The second part will describe how an appointed
Commission of Jurists for the drafting of a new Civil and
Commerce Code harmonized assisted reproductive
techniques with the legal issues embedded in “the beginning
of existence” articles. Additionally, this second part will
present some of the critiques associated with this draft of the
new Civil and Commerce Code, which were expressed
during its evaluation in the congressional debates. This
second part will argue that, while some interesting
developments guaranteeing access to assisted reproductive
techniques were achieved, the framing of this issue in the
Code still allows for interpretations that potentially threaten
individual human reproductive rights. Lastly, this part will
conclude by showing how the proposed regulation by the
Commission of Jurists on when life begins was meant to
reconstruct different dialects coming from the language of
rights on the matter, and hence, serves as a way of
accommodating these languages under a single narrative of
reproductive rights in private law.
A.   ACCESS TO ASSISTED REPRODUCTION TECHNIQUES
UNDER THE 1869 ARGENTINEAN CIVIL CODE
Efforts for determining when existence begins in the
Argentine legal order has been a recurring issue and practice
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in Argentinean legal consciousness since 1869, when the
National Congress approved the Civil Code drafted by
Dalmacio Vélez Sársfield.23 In his initial comparative law
undertaking, identifying and prescribing all possible legal
issues in private law, the author decided to prescribe “the
beginning of existence of persons before being born”:
ARTICLE 70: The existence of personhood
begins from the moment of conception in the
maternal womb. These persons, before being
born, may acquire certain rights as if they
would have already been born. Such rights are
irrevocably acquired if those conceived in the
maternal womb were born with life, even if
such livelihood lasted moments after being
separated from the mother.24
With relation to what is prescribed in this article, the
former Civil Code also established, in Article 51, that every
being that presents “human characteristics” shall be
considered a “person.”25 Along this reasoning, the former
Civil Code stated in Article 63 that unborn beings conceived
	
  
	
  
Law No. 340, Sept. 25, 1869.
CÓD. CIV. art. 70 (Arg.).
25 CÓD. CIV. art. 51 (Arg.). In the footnote to Article 70, Vélez Sársfield,
the codifier, says that, “in order to be considered a person, the child must
be born ‘a human creature.’” The codifier adds that “in order to be
capable of [having] rights, the child must present externally recognizable
characteristic signs of humanity; or must be, according to the Roman
characterization, neither monstruous nor prodigious; but a mere
deviation from the normal forms of humanity, for example an
extraneous or deficient limb, does not inhibit the capacity to possess
rights.” The text quoted by the codifier do not tell us by which signs to
recognize a human creature. It seems that the “pate ought to resemble
the [standard] human form.” Id. art. 70.
23
24
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in a maternal womb shall be considered “unborn persons.”26
The principle embedded in these articles states that unborn
beings might acquire legal personhood and become rightsbearers.27 Furthermore, the language of this article shows that
Velez Sarsfield sought to recognize legal protections for
unborn beings, regardless of the viability of the pregnancy.28
In light of the advances of reproductive science and the
access to ARTs, the language of these articles left a legal void,
since there was no legal certainty as to whether the practice of
these techniques contradicted the system of articles on the
beginning of life. Notwithstanding, given that in vitro
fertilization involves the generation of an embryo outside of
the maternal womb, a literal interpretation would mean that
such organism is not an unborn person, at least until it is
inserted in the maternal womb. Contrary to this
interpretation, case law from Argentina has interpreted
embryos and pronucleate oocytes as “unborn humane
persons” that have rights capable of trumping the exercise of
individual’s reproductive rights to access ARTs.29
The main example of this framing of the issue is R., R.
D. s/ medidas precautorias, a 1999 National Appellate Chamber
for Civil Matters case that shows an effort by the courts to
	
  
	
  
Id. art. 63.
Id. art. 70.
28 For a discussion of the legal status of anencephalic pregnancies in
Argentina, and an analysis of recent case law in several jurisdictions, see
Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman, Martín Hevia, & Bernard M.
Dickens, Prenatal Management of Anencephaly, 102 INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY
& OBSTETRICS 304, 306 (2008).
29 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil, Sala I [CNCiv.] [National
Court of Civil Appeals], 03/12/1999, “Rabinovich Ricardo David s/
medidas precautorias,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2000-III-630)
(Arg.) [hereinafter Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv.].
26
27
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harmonize the legal issue of the beginning of the existence of
personhood prescribed in the former Civil Code with ARTs
treatments.30 The case considered the petition of Dr.
Rabinovich, demanding legal protections for embryos and
pronucleate oocytes that are the object of assisted
reproductive techniques and treatments such as
cryopreservation.31 In the Chamber´s reasoning, the former
Civil Code and international human rights treaties, such as
the American Convention on Human Rights, allow for the
interpretation that embryos and pronucleate oocytes have
human personhood.32
The Court’s approach to the issue explains two
important points. First, the Chamber bases its reasoning on
international human rights law. This was made possible
given that, under Article 75(22) of Argentina’s Constitution,
certain international human rights treaties gain constitutional
status, and consequently, human rights provisions within
these treaties are considered recognized rights.33 In turn,
Article 4.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights
represents a legal tool that, under a certain interpretation,
may yield the result that embryos are right-holding persons
and, conversely, that their rights merit State protection.
Article 4.1 states: “Every person has the right to have his life
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in
general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.”34 As a consequence of
embryos being recognized as “unborn persons” and holders
	
  
	
  
Id. at 451.
Id. at 412.
32 Id. at 444.
33 Art. 75(22), CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) [hereinafter
CONST. NAC.].
34 American Convention art. 4(1).
30
31
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of a right to life, the Court also recognized their right to
physical and psychological integrity under Article 5(1) of the
American Convention.35 This is possible given the language
in which this right is framed, which states, “Every person has
the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity
respected.”36 Hence, as a matter of international human rights
law, the court recognized that such organisms have a right to
life and a right to physical and psychological integrity.
A second, related point is that the Chamber’s reasoning
appeals, to a great extent, to the lingua franca of rights agreed
upon within the Inter-American legal system. The Chamber
could have rested its decision entirely on the provisions from
the former Civil Code and on the fact that, at the moment of
its decision, there was no other federal statute addressing
such a private law matter.37 However, as explained
previously, the court delved into international human rights
law and delivered its sentence speaking from a common
language of rights, as accorded under Argentina’s
Constitution. Furthermore, the court uses such language to
introduce its ontological understandings on the matter of
when life begins and whether to recognize rights of embryos
or not. This is expressed, as the Chamber maintains, because
embryos undoubtedly present a unique genetic code that
serves as evidence of determinate individuality and
biological potentiality of developing into a person.38 In this
sense, the Courts use of the language of rights in justifying
their decisions and reveal a specific dialect within the lingua
franca of rights in the Inter-American System of Human
	
  
	
  
Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv., supra note 29, at 416.
American Convention art. 5(1).
37 Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv., supra note 29, at 414.
38 Id.
35
36
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Rights as they introduce a moral construction of the rights
recognized.
As a consequence of this reasoning, the Chamber
ordered that the embryos and pronucleate oocytes that
remain cryopreserved should not be used without the court’s
permission.39 The court also prohibited the extermination or
experimentation on these embryos and pronucleate oocytes.40
Lastly, it also ordered a census of each individual
cryopreserved embryo and assigned a children’s public
defender to each for its protection.41
The reasoning in this judgment, given the lack of
specific national legal regulation on assisted reproduction
techniques, became a source of reference among different
judicial authorities considering similar controversies.42
Interestingly, all of these cases show the influence from the
R., R. D. s/ medidas precautorias case, in the sense that they all
refer back to international human rights law as a base for
arguing that a rights-holding person exists beginning from
conception. Hence, tribunals have relied on the former Civil
	
  
	
  
Id. at 451.
Id.
41 Id. at 451.
42 See, e.g., Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Mar del Plata [CFed. Mar
del Plata] [Federal Court of Appeals of Mar del Plata], 29/12/2008, “L.,
H. A. et al. c. Instituto de Obra Médico Asistention & Others,” [S.J.A.]
(2009-10-06-2009) (Arg.) [hereinafter L., H. A. et al. – CFed. Mar del
Plata]; Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal
Court of Appeals of Salta], 03/09/2010, “R., N. F. et al. c. Obra Social del
Poder Judicial de la Nación,” Abeledo Perrot (2010-07-37) (Arg.)
[hereinafter R., N. F. et al. – CFed. Salta]; Cámara de Apelaciones en lo
Contecioso Administrativo de Mar del Plata [CApel.CC Mar del Plata]
[Administrative Claims Chamber of Appeals of Mar del Plata],
24/02/2012, “S., G. et al. c. I. O. M. A.,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.]
(2012-II-90) (Arg.) [hereinafter S., G. et al. – CApel.CC Mar del Plata].
39
40
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Code and international human rights law to argue that
embryos or pronucleate oocytes have legal personhood from
the moment of conception, either in or outside of the
maternal womb.
The R., R. D. s/ medidas precautorias case shows how the
structuring of the legal regime for ARTs is sustained
primarily on what is prescribed in the former Civil Code as
the beginning of the existence of personhood. Particularly,
these courts based their reasoning without properly
considering that the former Civil Code provides no legal
solution to conception occurring outside of the maternal
womb for the purposes of establishing the moment of
conception. On the contrary, this reasoning seems to stem
from an in dubio pro life presumption, where the mere
existence of human characteristics suffices for awarding such
organisms with the protections of human rights.43
This has been the legal tradition in Argentinean legal
order. Courts would usually consider the former Civil Code
to be the ultimate source of the law for deciding the fate of
private law controversies.44 This practice was explained on
the basis of the influences of the continental legal tradition
and French legal formalism in the post-revolutionary
period.45 With this context in mind, the principles and values
embedded in the National Constitution were applied by
courts primarily on controversies about the political
organization of the State, but not for the reasoning of private
	
  
	
  
Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv., supra note 29, at 416.
E.g., Martín Böhmer, Democracia de Poderes a la Argentina: Democracia en
las Formas, Monarquía en el Fondo, in EL PAÍS QUE QUEREMOS: PRINCIPIOS,
ESTRATEGIA, Y AGENDA PARA ALCANZAR UNA ARGENTINA MEJOR (Sergio
Berenztein et al. eds., 2006).
45Id. (for a discussion on the influence of the French formalist tradition in
Argentina).
43
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law disputes.46 This context explains how the fate of certain
practices, such as the access to ARTs, was decided on the
basis of the contents of the former Civil Code and was not
balanced by the human rights and State obligations
prescribed in the National Constitution.
On this last issue, for instance, the R., R. D. s/ medidas
precautorias case did not consider the human rights of
individuals seeking ARTs in the exercise of their reproductive
rights, right to family, or right to privacy. Additionally, the
court also failed to consider the autonomy principle
embedded in Article 19 of the National Constitution, which
states that the State shall not interfere with the private acts of
individuals whenever these acts are not prohibited by law.47
Regretfully, such omission in the reasoning of the case serves
as example of how private law controversies, where
adjudicated under the former Civil Code as the principal
source of law, disregard some of the more hierarchical
sources, such as the National Constitution or international
human rights law case law and doctrine.
The narrative of reproductive rights, as structured in
Argentinean institutions (i.e. Civil Code, Private Law Courts),
had been governed by a dialect of rights with an ontological
basis.48 Under this language of rights, embryos were found to
be “unborn human persons” with rights and, conversely, the
State had an obligation to guarantee absolute protection of
their rights.49 Such absolute protection of embryos’ right to
life meant prohibiting the destruction, experimentation, or
	
  
	
  
Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti, CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACION
COMENTADO: TOMO I 36-37 (Santa Fe: Rubinzal-Culzoni ed., 2014).
47 Art. 19, CONST. NAC. (Arg.).
48 CÓD. PROC. CIV. Y. COM. art. 19 (Arg.); CÓD. CIV. art. 70 (Arg.).
49 Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv., supra note 29.
46
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cryopreservation of them, as well as limiting access to
ARTs.50 The Court’s determination also meant limiting
individual’s enjoyment of their right to form a family and
their right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, but it
also limited physicians’ or scientists’ right to work and their
right of association.51 The ontological basis was also used to
justify restrictions on access to emergency contraception.52
However, in the context of the reform of the Civil and
Commerce Codes, a different resisting dialect, also channeled
through the language of rights, found an institutional setting
with the purpose of accommodating individuals’ right to
form a family and brought legal clarity to legal parenthood
issues that were emerging as a consequence of ARTs.
B.   THE BEGINNING OF EXISTENCE IN THE DRAFT OF THE NEW
CIVIL AND COMMERCE CODE
In 2011, a Commission of Jurists, whose members were
Justice Ricardo Lorenzetti (President of the Supreme Court of
Justice), Justice Elena Highton de Nolasco (Vice-President of
the Supreme Court of Justice), and former Justice Aída
Kemelmajer de Carlucci, were entrusted by President Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner with the work of reforming the Civil
and Commerce Code of Argentina.53 In 2012, they delivered a
	
  
	
  
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 11.
52 See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National
Supreme Court of Justice], 05/03/2002, “Portal de Belén Asociación Civil
sin Fines de Lucro c. Ministerio de Salud de la Nación/ANMAT,” [J.A.]
(2002-III-472) (Arg.) [hereinafter Portal de Belén Asociación Civil sin
Fines de Lucro – CSJN]. For a discussion of the case law on emergency
contraception, see Hevia, supra note 1.
53 Executive Decree No. 191/2011, Feb. 28, 2011, B.O. 32101 (Arg.).
50
51
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draft for consideration by President Fernández, who then
presented a (somewhat) amended version to the National
Congress.54
The reasons expressed by the Commission of Jurists’
for introducing reforms to the former Civil Code included an
express statement that private law matters should not be
governed solely by what is prescribed in the Code, but also
by human rights treaties that the State has adopted as part of
the National Constitution.55 This governing principle, calling
for the constitutionalization of private law, sought on the one
hand, to harmonize the classic divide between public and
private law and human rights, and on the other hand, to
create a more binding obligation on judges for the application
and enforcement of State human rights obligations in private
law controversies.56
Regarding the governance of reproductive rights in the
context of private law situations or relations, the Commission
of Jurists decided that it was relevant for the new Civil and
Commerce Code to “set” the beginning of human
personhood.57 To that end, the draft of the Commission of
Jurists established in Article 19,

	
  
	
  
Modificaciones del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional al Anteproyecto de Reforma del
Código Civil elaborado por la Comisión de Reformas, NUEVO CODIGO,
http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/7Fundamentos-de-los-cambios-introducidos-por-el-P.E.N..pdf (last visited
Jan. 13, 2016).
55 Art. 75, § 22, CONST. NAC. (Arg.).
56 Fundamentos del Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación,
NUEVO
CODIGO
4,
http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/5-Fundamentos-del-Proyecto.pdf (last visited
Jan. 13, 2016).
57 Id.
54
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ARTICLE 19. The existence of human
personhood begins with the conception in the
maternal womb. In the case of exercise of
assisted reproductive techniques, it begins
with the implantation of the embryo on the
woman, notwithstanding that which a special
Statute may prescribe for the protection of the
non-implanted embryo.58
Given this new opportunity to legislate when human
personhood begins, the draft redacted by the Commission of
Jurists chose to set a principle slightly similar to the one of
Sarsfield’s Code. In general, for the purposes of private law,
the existence of a human legal person begins at the moment
of conception in the maternal womb. However, the
Commission of Jurists was aware of the need to contemplate
the practice of ARTs under Argentine private law. To that
end, the proposed Article 19 established a distinction
between ARTs and natural reproduction. For the latter, the
beginning of legal personhood seemed to be at the moment of
conception in the maternal womb; whereas for ARTs it was
determined at the moment of implantation in the woman. Do
conception and implantation refer to different moments for
determining when legal personhood begins? What drives this
distinction?
The distinction prescribed in Article 19 of the draft of
the Civil and Commerce Code could be interpreted as
establishing two different moments where legal personhood
	
  
	
  
PROYECTO CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [PROYECTO CÓD.
CIV. Y COM.] [DRAFT CIVIL AND COMMERCE CODE] art. 19 (2012) (Arg.),
www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/texto-proyectode-codigo-civil-y-comercial-de-la-nacion.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
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begins. For natural reproduction purposes, legal personhood
begins at the moment of conception in the maternal womb.59
Alternatively, for ARTs purposes, the beginning of legal
personhood occurs at the moment the embryo is implanted in
the woman. This distinction suggests that law could be
recognizing legal personhood and legal protections for life
developed under natural processes of reproduction prior to
the establishment of these rights for embryos in ARTs. This is
because an embryo may be considered conceived because of
the mere fact of being inside the maternal womb by
implantation. Argentina’s Supreme Court of Justice
recognized this reading in a case where it declared the
unconstitutionality of commercialization and distribution of
emergency contraception.60 The Court established in this old
jurisprudence that conception occurs at the moment of
fertilization between ova and sperm.61 Thus, it would seem
that conception for purposes of contraception and ARTs is
understood to begin at different biological moments, which
would render a distinction in their legal status for the Civil
Code. In support of this reasoning, the draft of the Civil and
Commerce Code further prescribes that non-implanted
embryos may have a legal status that is yet to be determined
by a special law;62 conversely, this reflects that the legal status
of embryos conceived in the maternal womb is clear and is
protected by law.
In light of this, what drives this distinction? Is this
proposed new regulation coming from a language of rights?
	
  
	
  
Id.
Portal de Belén Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro – CSJN, supra note 52.
61 Id.
62
PROYECTO
CÓD.
CIV.
Y
COM.
art.
19
(Arg.),
www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/texto-proyectode-codigo-civil-y-comercial-de-la-nacion.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
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What is the Commission of Jurists trying to communicate
about this distinct value of the development of life in natural
reproduction and ARTs?
It could be argued that the Commission of Jurists
prescribed this distinction and cast doubt on the need to
recognize legal status or legal protection for non-implanted
embryos for the purpose of deterring judicial reasoning like
that described in the R., R. D. s/ medidas precautorias case.
Under this thesis, the distinction would respond to the need
for not obstructing access to ARTs, including services as
cryopreservation, without the legal uncertainty that anyone
could later claim the right to life and physical integrity of
embryos. Hence, unless the embryos formed have been
implanted in the woman, individuals are free to form
embryos and even cryopreserve them without the obligation
to immediately use all of them.
Alternatively, the motives of the draft by the
Commission of Jurists explain that determining a special
regulation for when human personhood begins in the case of
ARTs responds to regulating the issue of legal parenthood.63
In this sense, it is important to consider the case law spurred
in private law that discusses the issue of paternity and even
property rights for the disposition of embryos in ARTs.64
In P., A. v. S., A. C., a separated couple entered into a
judicial dispute over the right of the woman to implant
embryos in her body without the consent of her ex-

	
  
	
  
Fundamentos del Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación,
NUEVO CODIGO 27, http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/textos-oficiales2/ (last visited Oct 15, 2015).
64 For a discussion of property rights on embryos and other related
issues, see generally Hevia & Herrera Vacaflor, supra note 13.
63
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husband.65 They both contributed their gametes for the
formation of embryos at a moment when they were still
married, and entered into a contract with an ART Institute for
the cryopreservation of the embryos.66 Under that contract,
the married couple agreed that, in case they separated,
judicial intervention would be employed if either of the
parties refused to consent to the other’s use of the embryos.67
The judges discussed the woman’s right to use the
embryos without the consent of her former husband, as well
as his right not to become a parent.68 In their judgment, the
Appeals Chamber reasoned that the former husband’s denial
of the contract and his “procreational will” given at the
moment of the in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment ignores the
nature of the embryos and contradicts the principle of
estoppel in Argentinean private law.69 Furthermore, the
Appeals Chamber maintained that the former husband’s
defense that he no longer wanted to be a parent was
implausible.70 The judges reasoned that the husband’s genetic
parenthood was already established at the moment he agreed
to the IVF treatment.71 Moreover, his agreement to such
treatment also meant that he was aware of the consequences
for the embryos, in the event that the couple separated.72 In
conclusion, the former husband’s willingness to submit to the
	
  
	
  
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil, Sala J [CNCiv.] [National
Court of Civil Appeals], 13/09/2011, “P., A. c. S., A. C.,” La Ley [L.L.]
(2011-E-435) [hereinafter P., A. c. S., A. C. – L.L.].
66 Id. at 438.
67 Id. at 437.
68 Id. at 437-39.
69 Id. at 438-39.
70 Id. at 439.
71 Id. at 438-39.
72 Id. at 438.
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IVF treatment and consequent agreement to the contractual
provisions disabled him from exercising a future refusal, as
well as from exercising his right not to become a legal
parent.73
With regard to the right of the woman to have the
embryos implanted in her body, the judges authorized the
procedure under what could be understood as the “right of
the embryos to be born with life.”74 Under this reasoning, the
Chamber had to first argue that cryopreserved embryos
could be recognized as “unborn human persons” and then
argue that these embryos are right-holders to life.
The court justified the woman’s right to use the embryos
by arguing that cryopreserved embryos are unborn human
persons with rights, as recognized by the former Civil Code.75
However the Chamber was aware that the former Code did
not establish anything about conception occurring outside the
maternal womb.76 In turn, the judges argued that it should be
understood that conception can occur outside the maternal
womb, since the codifier could not possibly know that science
would achieve such a thing in the future.77 This is so, given
that embryos are organisms that have human characteristics
and have been conceived, although not in the maternal
womb, as established in Article 70.78 The judges also argued
	
  
	
  
See I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1115 (2008) (on the distinctions between genetic parenthood and
legal parenthood).
74 Martín Hevia & Ezequiel Spector, El derecho a no formar una familia: a
Propósito del Fallo “P., A. v. S., A. C. s/ medidas precautorias”, in REVISTA DE
DERECHO DE FAMILIA Y DE LAS PERSONAS 230 (2011).
75 See P., A. c. S., A. C. – L.L., supra note 65.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 CÓD. CIV. art. 70 (Arg.).
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that conception should be interpreted as fertilization, as the
Supreme Court did in its judgment on the unconstitutionality
of the manufacture, distribution, and commercialization of
emergency contraceptive medicine.79
Once it was established that the embryo is an unborn
human person, the judges consequently rested their
reasoning on the R., R. D. s/ medidas precautorias case rationale
in order to conclude that embryos have a right to life and
physical and psychological integrity.80 In other words, the
judges in this case awarded the woman the right to implant
the embryos and, hence, become a mother, on the basis of an
apparent right of the embryos to be born with life.81
In attending to the emergence of such case law, the
Commission of Jurists deemed it necessary to provide legal
prescriptions in their draft of the Civil and Commerce Code
that addressed the issue of parenthood in ARTs. 82 To such
end, the beginning of the existence of legal personhood in
ARTs begins with implantation of the embryo in the maternal
womb. Different reasons drive this new determination. To
begin with, it could be interpreted that until implantation,
there is no legal interest awarded to the embryo by the draft
of the Civil and Commerce Code. Consequently, judges
would not be able to follow the analyzed stream of case law
that understands that there is legal parenthood by
individuals who engage in IVF merely for the fertilization
occurring in the formation of the embryo. Similarly, it would
prevent arguments that award rights to the embryo prior to
	
  
	
  
Portal de Belén Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro – CSJN, supra note 52.
Rabinovich Ricardo David – CNCiv., supra note 29.
81 Hevia & Spector, supra note 74.
82 Fundamentos del Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación,
supra note 63.
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implantation, and hence, would not allow for the recognition
of an embryo’s right to be born and force legal parenthood on
an individual who does not want implantation to occur.
In fact, other provisions in the draft of the Civil and
Commerce Code also address possible contingencies between
legal parenthood and the practice of ARTs.83 Article 560
prescribes that health institutions providing ART services
must obtain previous, free, and informed consent from
individuals who seek the treatment, and that these
institutions must renew this consent every time there is a use
of the gametes or embryos.84 Additionally, it establishes that
individuals who are undergoing ART treatments can revoke
their consent as long as conception or implantation of the
embryo in the woman has not occurred.85 As a result of these
articles, the Commission of Jurists’ draft established that legal
parenthood would not be determined genetically;86 that is,
legal parenthood is determined independently of whose
gametes were used for achieving reproduction. Instead, the
Commission created the concept of “procreational will.”87
Under this concept, legal parenthood is established on the
basis of the individual’s intention to form a family, rather
than the biological nexus with the newborn.88 This concept
also seeks to stress the importance of the will of the
individuals who wish to form a family, rather than their
biological capacity to reproduce. In this sense, the
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CÓD.
CIV.
Y
COM.
(Arg.),
www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/texto-proyectode-codigo-civil-y-comercial-de-la-nacion.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
84 Id. art. 560.
85 Id.
86 Id. art. 561.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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determination of legal parenthood without regard to
biological connection respects the exercise of the right to form
a family by same-sex couples recognizing their autonomy
and participation in society without discrimination.
Thus, the current development in Argentinean case law
on legal parenthood and ARTs, and the legal developments
prescribed in the draft of the Civil and Commerce Code,
provide a reason as to why the draft included a distinction
regarding the beginning of the existence of legal personhood
in ARTs. More importantly, these legal developments
showed the need for legal clarity and determination of the
effects ARTs had on establishing legal parenthood. On a
different note, what does this distinction about when legal
personhood begins communicate to the Argentinean Legal
System? It could be argued that under the governing
principle of constitutionalization of private law, the Commission
of Jurists aimed to nudge judges, policy-makers, and
individuals to contemplate and act in conformity with the
international human rights and constitutional rights
provisions. Furthermore, it could be argued that under such
governing principle, the Commission of Jurists sought to
invite Argentineans to embrace a lingua franca of rights
among each other at the moment of entering into relations
that may trigger legal effects in private law. In this sense, the
new regulation on when legal personhood begins and its
focus on ARTs as drafted by the Commission of Jurists are
channeled through a language of rights. The legal effects of
what is prescribed in Article 19 discloses that individuals
have a right to form a family and a right to benefit from the
scientific progress, and it also concedes that there may be
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rights claims about the non-implanted embryos.89 In contrast
to what has been established in the case law analyzed
previously, the Commission of Jurists proposed a new regime
for ARTs out of a certain dialect of rights that understands
absolute protection of an embryo unreasonably restricts
individuals’ rights.90 Hence, the language of rights embedded
in Article 19 accommodated different rights claims and
discourses on how reproductive rights should be regulated.
These legal developments addressed by the
Commission of Jurists’ draft to the new Civil and Commerce
Code were discussed in the National Congress.91 In this
institutional setting, the dialect of rights advanced by the
Commission of Jurists attracted critiques from conservative
groups that also framed their observations using the
language of rights, but in a dialect that relies on metaphysical
bases.
For instance, the Argentinean Episcopal Conference
critiqued the decision of the Commission not to recognize
legal value and personhood to the non-implanted embryo.92
	
  
	
  
Eleonora Lamm, El Embrión in Vitro en el Proyecto de Reforma de Código
Civil y Comercial, in DERECHO DE LAS FAMILIAS, INFANCIA, Y
ADOLESCENCIA: UNA MIRADA CRÍTICA Y CONTEMPORANEA 413-416
(Marisa Graham & Marisa Herrera, eds., 2014).
90 Fundamentos del Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación,
supra note 63.
91 Resolución de la H.C.D.N, Resolution of the Honorable Chamber of
Representatives
of
the
National
Congress,
http://ccycn.congreso.gob.ar/resolucion.html (on the command to
discuss the draft of the Commission of Jurist of the Civil and Commerce
Code for its approval).
92 Conferencia Episcopal Argentina [Argentina’s Episcopal Conference],
Reflexiones y Aportes sobre algunos temas vinculados a la Reforma del Código
Civil, Comisión Bicameral para la Reforma, Actualización, y Unificación del
Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, Ponencias Buenos Aires,
89
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In the opinion of the Argentinean Episcopal Conference, life
(and legal personhood) begins at the moment of conception;93
this opinion highlights the fact that there is no ontological
distinction between being conceived in the maternal womb or
outside of the maternal womb. Hence, the location where the
embryos are conceived does not alter their human condition
because they each represent a determinate individuality.94 In
regard to this, Lafferriere argues that the draft seems to
recognize, to some extent, the scientific evidence that the
individual human condition begins at the moment of fusion
between gametes.95 However, in order to accommodate the
needs of contemporary society (i.e. the practice of ARTs
unregulated), the non-implanted embryo was not given legal
status.96 Hence, Lafferriere maintains that the distinction
proposed by the draft of the Civil and Commerce Code is
knowingly arbitrary in its recognition of the human
characteristics of the non-implanted embryo, and guided by
the economic interests of the biotechnology industry.97
As a consequence, Lafferriere and the Argentinean
Episcopal Conference further argued that such arbitrariness
could not withstand scrutiny in the face of Argentina’s
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nificacioncodigos/ponencias/buenosaires/pdfs/050_Arancedo_Mons__
Pensamiento_y_Aportes.pdf [hereinafter Argentina’s Episcopal
Conference].
93 Id. at 5.
94 Id.
95 JORGE NICOLÁS LAFFERRIERE, PONENCIA DEL CENTRO DE BIOÉTICA,
PERSONA
Y
FAMILIA
6
(2012),
http://www.unav.edu/matrimonioyfamilia/observatorio/uploads/300
89_Centro-Bioetica_Ponencia-2012.pdf.
96 Id. at 6-7.
97 Id. at 6.
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international human rights obligations.98 Through the lingua
franca of human rights, the Episcopal Conference maintained
that Argentina’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child supported the Episcopal Conference’s
interpretation that non-implanted embryos should be legal
persons.99
Under Article 1, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child defines a child as a human being of less than eighteen
years of age, unless internal law of a State Party recognizes
adulthood before that age.100 Upon ratification of the treaty,
Argentina exercised an interpretative declaration stating:
“child means every human being from the moment of
conception up to the age of eighteen.”101 Hence, the Episcopal
Conference holds that the Argentinean declaration makes no
distinction with regard to where conception occurs and
confirms that the beginning of legal personhood under
Argentinean internal law is at the moment of conception.102
Consequently, the Episcopal Conference began drawing
attention to the unjust discrimination embedded in the
distinction prescribed in Article 19 of the draft of the Civil
and Commerce Code. Notwithstanding the problems that this
may have raised about affording legal personhood to the
non-implanted embryo for family law and private law, the
Episcopal Conference maintained that the best solution was
not to ignore the embryo’s right to dignity and right to life,
which is a part of their human condition.103 In conclusion,
	
  
	
  
Id. at 8; Argentina’s Episcopal Conference, supra note 93, at 5-6.
Id. at 5-6.
100 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44.24, art. 1 (Nov. 20, 1989).
101 Law No. 23849, Art. 2, Oct. 16, 1990, B.O. 269983 (Arg.).
102 Argentina’s Episcopal Conference, supra note 93, at 5-6.
103 Id. at 6.
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conservative groups again advocated for the absolute
protection of the embryo as constituting a human person
with rights grounded in the language of rights.
In light of these critiques surrounding Article 19, as well
as others presented around the country, in 2013, the National
Congress reformed the draft of the Civil and Commerce Code
of the Commission of Jurists.104 Under the political will of the
majority party in the National Congress, the text of Article 19
was reformed using language that failed to keep up with the
current practices of individuals regarding their reproductive
rights.105
Thus far, this section presented the debate for
structuring a narrative for reproductive rights in Argentinean
legal order. In this debate, this section described the
participation of the former and the draft of the Civil and
Commerce Code as interpreted by courts, jurists, and social
movements. An analysis of the interaction of the different
voices in this debate reveals the fact that opposing
perspectives on the exercise of reproductive rights channel
their arguments through the same lingua franca of human
rights, with the peculiarity that these groups construct their
language under different dialects.
On the one hand, using metaphysical or ontological
arguments, courts and conservative groups advocated for the
absolute protection of embryos, disregarding individual’s
right to form a family or enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress. On the other hand, a Commission of Jurists, in view
of the case law that was spurred on the basis of the former
	
  
	
  
Código Civil: polémicas por la Existencia y el artículo 19, CBA24N (Oct. 1,
2014), http://www.cba24n.com.ar/content/codigo-civil-polemicas-porla-existencia-y-el-articulo-19.
105 Id.
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Civil Code and international human rights law, understood
that it was important to keep Argentinean legal order abreast
of the current living conditions of individuals and provide
legal solutions for contemporary problems. To such end, the
use of embryos merited regulation in their draft of the Civil
and Commerce Code in order to respect individuals’ legal
parenthood claims, but the Commission also recognized that
the Congress could later award legal protections to nonimplanted embryos. In this sense, under the principle of the
constitutionalization of private law, the Commission of Jurists
sought to accommodate competing interests that past case
law had adjudicated without clear legal rules.
The next section will critically analyze the outcome of
this debate: the approval of Article 19 of the Civil and
Commerce Code and its effects for the legal regime of ARTs.
This analysis will shed light on the regressive legislative
decision adopted by the National Congress and the
challenges for structuring a narrative for reproductive rights
that abides with international human rights law, as
established in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica.106
C.   ARGENTINA’S NEW CIVIL AND COMMERCE CODE:
ARTICLE 19 AND THE ENJOYMENT OF REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS
At the end of the congressional debates over the draft of
the Civil and Commerce Code presented by the Commission
of Jurists, the majority party introduced modifications. Some
of these reforms were approved by other Congressional
minority political parties, but other reforms responded to
core political perspectives of the majority party. However,
	
  
	
  
106

See Hevia & Herrera Vacaflor, supra note 13.
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there had been consensus on the drafted text of Article 19.
Surprisingly, at the last moment, the majority party included
a change to Article 19. The change was surprising, even for
representatives of the majority party.107 In fact, strangely,
when the final draft of the Civil and Commerce Code was
introduced for its approval in the Senate, senators from the
opposing and majority party expressed the need to further
reform Article 19, possibly during its discussion in the House
of Representatives.108 Nevertheless, the House of
Representatives left Article 19 unchanged.109

	
  
	
  
According to media coverage, the change in the text was due to
concessions made by the National Government to the Catholic Church.
See Código Civil: con cambios que pidió la Iglesia, apuran la sanción, CLARÍN
(Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.clarin.com/edicion-impresa/Codigo-Civilcambios-Iglesia-sancion_0_1220877916.html; Mariano De Vedia, La
Reforma del Código Civil va a debate con el aval de la Iglesia, LA NACIÓN
(Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1731221-la-reforma-delcodigo-civil-va-a-debate-con-el-aval-de-la-iglesia.
108 República Argentina Versión Taquigráfica (Provisional) Cámara De
Senadores De La Nación, 19th Reunión, 9th Sesión especial 135, 139-140
(Nov. 27-28, 2013) (Congressional Debate on the Reform, Actualization
and Unification of Civil and Commerce Codes of the Nation) (Arg.).
Miguel Angel Pichetto, the Leader of the Majority Party in the Senate
(Frente para la Victoria) expressed, “The second theme I want to
mention, and I do not want to bore you with numbers, is that the article
19 does not satisfy me either. I have a secular belief; that is, the things
that are of the State belong to the State and the things that are of God
belong to God. . . . I hope that this [article 19] be corrected in the House
of Representatives [at the time they decide the approval of the Civil and
Commerce Code]” (author’s translation). With a similar critique,
Gerardo Morales, the Leader of the First Minority Party in the Senate
(Unión Cívica Radical) also claimed, “If there is not conceptual clarity in
[this version of] article 19, then we are not contributing anything. The
previous text of article 19 did give a conceptual clarity, as it stated that
there is beginning of life in cases of assisted human reproduction when
107
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Under these new modifications, the new text of Article
19 prescribes, “ARTICLE 19. Beginning of Existence. The
existence of human personhood begins at conception.”110
Despite the political consequences raised by this final reform
to Article 19, this change in the text also resulted in legal
consequences for ARTs. The final version of Article 19,
approved by the National Congress, reintroduced the legal
uncertainty of whether embryos should be considered legal
persons with protected rights.111 Furthermore, this final and
approved version of Article 19 demonstrates that the debate
at the National Congress was won by the metaphysical or
ontological language of rights-based attributions for arguing
when life begins. The regression in the explicit recognition of
the normative term “implantation” and the distinction
between biological and assisted reproduction along the
debate (see Table 1) shows that the juridical logic of the
Commission of Jurists was not fully regarded, nor were
voices raised in their defense by legislators.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
the embryo is in the maternal womb. Then, [this final version of article
19] fall short in this respect” (author’s translation). Id.
109 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN [CÓD. CIV. Y COM.] [CIVIL
AND COMMERCE CODE] art. 19 (2015) (Arg.).
110 Id.
111 RICARDO LUIS LORENZETTI (DIR.), CODIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA
NACION COMENTADO: TOMO I 89-91 (Rubinzal-Culzoni Ed., 1st Ed. 2014).
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Table 1112
ARTICLE 70
(Former Civil
Code)

The existence of
personhood begins
from the moment
of conception in the
maternal womb.
These persons,
before being born,
may acquire certain
rights as if they
were already born.
Such rights are
irrevocably
acquired if those
conceived in the
maternal womb
were born with life,
even if such
livelihood lasted
moments after
being separated
from the mother.

ARTICLE 19
(Civil and
Commerce Code
drafted by
Commission of
Jurists)
The existence of
human personhood
begins with the
conception in the
maternal womb. In
the case of exercise
of assisted
reproductive
techniques, it begins
with the
implantation of the
embryo in the
woman,
notwithstanding that
which a special
Statute may
prescribe for the
protection of the
non-implanted
embryo.

	
  
	
  
112

The translation of these articles is our own.

ARTICLE 19
(Civil and
Commerce Code
of Argentina)
The existence of
human
personhood
begins at
conception.
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Under this new reality, defining the beginning of
existence of legal personhood generally at the moment of
conception failed to address the legal issues brought up in the
case law on ARTs. In light of this legal uncertainty, what
interpretation should be given to the term “conception”?
What are the legal effects of this final reform on the legal
regime of ARTs? Would the embryo be considered a legal
person with rights? Which rights would embryos have: the
right to life and the right to be born? If cryopreservation is
found to affect the embryos’ right to be born, could women
be forced to have all of their embryos implanted? This section
will present a critique to the final text of Article 19 of the new
Civil and Commerce Code, as approved by the National
Congress, based on the fact that it ignores the legal
developments set in international human rights law.
The term conception should be interpreted following
discourse based on a language of rights advocated by the
different groups that participated in drafting the Civil and
Commerce Code. One important reason for structuring this
debate under the language of rights stems from the
governing principle of this Civil Code: the constitutionalization
of private law. Under this principle, private law matters
involving the enjoyment of reproductive rights by
individuals must be interpreted with attention to the human
rights obligations adopted by Argentina in signing
international human rights treaties.113
With this principle in mind, interpretations around the
term conception should take into consideration, in particular,
what the American Convention on Human Rights has
prescribed on the subject. As has been analyzed throughout
this article, Article 4(1) of the American Convention has been
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LORENZETTI, supra note 111, at 29-31.
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used for arguing in favor of absolute protection of the
embryo. In 2012, the IACtHR has issued the sentence in
Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, in which the scope of Article 4(1)
was determined, especially the term conception, in the
context of an absolute prohibition on access to in vitro
fertilization dictated by Costa Rica’s Supreme Court.114
IACtHR’s determination of the scope of the term
conception regarding when persons have a right to life is
relevant for interpreting Article 19 of the Argentinean Civil
and Commerce Code for at least two reasons. Firstly,
Argentina’s Supreme Court has established that, when
interpreting an international human rights obligation
assumed by Argentina under the American Convention on
Human Rights, the doctrine established by IACtHR
jurisprudence is the most authoritative voice, and conversely,
it should be applied and incorporated in courts’ reasoning.115
In this sense, using the case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, the
IACtHR has established that the judicial branch of State
Parties of the American Convention must apply both the
American Convention on Human Rights, as well as an
authoritative interpretation of the rights therein, as set forth
	
  
	
  
Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN][National Supreme
Court of Justice], 13/07/2007, “Mazzeo, Julio Lilo y otros s/ rec. de
casación e inconstitucionalidad,” Fallos (2007-330-3248) (Arg.). See also
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN][National Supreme Court
of Justice], 27/11/2012, “Rodríguez Pereyra, Jorge Luis y otra c. Ejercito
Argentino s/ daños y perjuicios,” Fallos (2012-335-2333) (Arg.) (the
Supreme Court, reinstating the doctrine established by the IACtHR,
declared that Argentina’s Judiciary not only has an obligation to exercise
a judicial review with basis on the National Constitution but also on the
basis of the American Convention on Human Rights. Thus, courts in
exercising their judicial review must apply and interpret international
human rights treaties ratified by Argentina.).
114
115
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by the IACtHR.116 Thus, whenever courts in Argentina must
face interpreting the term conception in Article 19 of the Civil
and Commerce Code, they must do so in accordance with the
jurisprudence set by the IACtHR in Artavia Murillo v. Costa
Rica.
Secondly, under the principle of constitutionalization of
private law, any private law judicial controversy regarding
access or practices in the context of ARTs and embryos under
Article 19 of the approved Civil and Commerce Code should
apply the doctrine established in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica
as an authoritative legal material. In this sense, the expression
of motives set by the drafters of the Civil and Commerce
Code maintained that the regulation established for the
protection of the human person (i.e. Article 19) is
reconstructed with attention to Argentina’s international
human rights obligations.117 Hence, whenever judges reason
on what interpretation should be given to the term
“conception” in order to determine if an embryo is a human
person with rights protections, the court must consider what
the IACtHR has declared on what “conception” means under
the American Convention.
On the basis of the analysis presented, what was the
scope given to the term “conception” by the IACtHR? In
Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, the IACtHR established when
life begins for the purposes of determining which entities are

	
  
	
  
Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶¶ 125-128 (Sept. 26, 2006)
[hereinafter Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile].
117 PROYECTO CÓD. CIV. Y COM. § Aspectos Valorativos [Valorative
Aspects of the Project of Civil and Commercial Code] (Arg.),
http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/textos-oficiales-2/.
116
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not entitled to a right to life under Article 4(1) and Article
1(2), which states “person means every human being.”118
In Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, the IACtHR discussed
the Costa Rican Supreme Court sentence declaring the
absolute prohibition of access to IVF under the argument that
IVF practices violate the right to life and human dignity of
embryos.119 Consequently, the IACtHR had to determine the
following issues: (i) whether embryos were persons under the
American Convention, and thus, were entitled to the
protection under the right to life; and (ii) if the absolute
protection was a proportionate limit on individual’s rights for
the embryo’s right to life.120
With regards to the first issue, the IACtHR had to
determine the legal status of the embryo in order to assess if
the embryo should be considered a person and thus, entitled
to a right to life. To such end, the IACtHR referenced Article
4(1), which establishes the following: “Every person has the
right to have his life respected. This right shall be respected
by law and, in general, from the moment of conception . . .
.”121 In light of this, the IACtHR interpreted Article 4(1) and
assessed when life begins under the term “moment of
conception”
through
four
different
interpretative
hermeneutics: (1) interpretation in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of the terms; (2) systematic and historical
interpretation; (3) evolutive interpretation; and (4) the most
favorable interpretation, the object and purpose of the
treaty.122
	
  
	
  
American Convention art. 1(2).
Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13, ¶ 2.
120 Id. ¶¶ 171, 272.
121 American Convention art. 4(1).
122 See generally Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13, ¶¶ 174264.
118
119
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The IACtHR admitted that the term “conception” at
the moment of the drafting of the American Convention
could not have possibly contemplated practices such as IVF
because these practices did not exist.123 Conversely, the
current state of the art in scientific and juridical literature has
found two major trains of thought for explaining the term
“conception.” 124 One side of the literature maintains that it is
the moment of fertilization, that is, the union or fertilization
of the egg by the spermatozoid.125 The other side of the
literature understands “conception” to be the moment when
the fertilized egg is implanted in the uterus. 126 With attention
to such disagreements, the IACtHR is aware that most
accounts of when life beings, or considerations on whether
embryos or pre-embryos constitute a human being, rest on
conceptualizations that grant metaphysical or ontological
attributes to embryos. Such accounts, the IACtHR
understands, cannot prevail over other kinds of literature
explaining whether embryos are human beings, because
doing so would imply the imposition of certain beliefs on
others who do not share them.127
In light of this, the IACtHR reasoned that even though
the embryo represents a “different cell with the sufficient
genetic information for the potential development of a
human being,” such development could not happen
	
  
	
  
Id. ¶ 180.
Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. ¶¶ 174-264
127 Id. ¶ 185.
123
124
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independently of a uterus. 128 The scientific literature
presented caused the IACtHR to determine that, without
implantation in a uterus, an embryo cannot acquire the
necessary nutrients for its development. 129 Hence, the
IACtHR ascertains that conception should be interpreted at
the moment of implantation, which is when the embryo can
develop into a human being.130 In other words, the nonimplanted embryo would not constitute a subject protected
by Article 4(1) of the American Convention.131
	
  
	
  
Id. ¶¶ 186-187.
Id. ¶ 186
130 Id. ¶¶ 186-189.
131 For a critique of this argument, see Eduardo Rivera López, Conception,
Fertilization and the Onset of Human Personhood: A Note on the Case Artavia
Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, 6 INTER-AM. & EUR. H. R. J. 54, 59 (2013). Rivera
López agrees with not recognizing legal personhood for in vitro
embryos, but argues that the discussion about the recognition of legal
personhood is a normative argument; thus, it cannot be based solely on
scientific information:
[A]n argument of a juridical-normative kind cannot be
supported (exclusively) by empirical premises. The
Court suggests that the “current” scientific “schools of
thought”
support
two
possible
conflicting
interpretations. However, no such substantive
disagreement can exist in biology. Biological science can
only describe and explain the different stages of
embryonic development. Nothing normative can be
extracted from this alone without committing a
naturalistic fallacy. Claiming that one of the current
scientific
schools
identifies
conception
with
implantation (or with fertilization) implies either
mistakenly ascribing some normative content to science
or mistakenly identifying a terminological issue with a
real one. . . . what is truly relevant for the Court’s
decision in the case is not whether conception occurs
with fertilization or with implantation, but rather from
128
129
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2.   SYSTEMATIC AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
Once the IACtHR determined that conception should
be interpreted as the moment when the embryo is implanted
in a uterus, the Court analyzed whether the implanted
embryo should be recognized with an absolute protection of
the right to life, as the Supreme Court of Costa Rica had
established. The Court understood that the interpretation of
the protections under Article 4(1) should be analyzed with
attention to the legal system to which it belongs.132 In this
sense, a systematic interpretation of the meaning and scope of
the right to life should take into account what international
human rights have established on the matter.133 For such
purposes, on the one hand, the IACtHR historically
interpreted what the drafters of Article 4(1) of the American
Convention intended to protect. On the other hand, the
IACtHR also interpreted what other human rights systems
(i.e. the Universal Human Rights System, the European
Human Rights System, and the African Human Rights
System) have contributed to the interpretations of the right to
life in the context of reproductive rights. The Court’s findings
showed, firstly, that despite the intention of some drafters to
eliminate the provision of “from the moment of conception”
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
which moment do we consider that a human being
(from the biological point of view) deserves legal
protection, in the sense of possessing a right to life, and
if, at early stages of development, this right is strong
enough to displace other rights enshrined in the
Convention (such as the rights to privacy and equality,
among others).
Id.
132
133

Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13, ¶ 191.
Id.
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or “in general,” such efforts were fruitless.134 Secondly,
throughout a review of the different existing international
human rights systems, the IACtHR found that courts and
human rights instruments have recognized neither an
absolute protection nor an absolute right to life for
embryos.135 Instead, courts have identified that embryos have
potential development and, conversely, they have recognized
legal protection in balance with the human rights protections
recognized in such treaties to the pregnant woman or the
individuals who seek to form a family.136 Thus, the IACtHR
understands that embryos, either implanted or not, have no
recognized absolute protection of a right to life.137
3.   EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION
The IACtHR also considers that when interpreting the
scope of the right to life in the context of IVF, one must
comprehend that “human rights treaties are living
instruments, whose interpretation must keep abreast . . .

	
  
	
  
Id. ¶ 221; see also Christian B. White & Gary K. Potter v. Estados
Unidos de América, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.23/81,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.54, doc.9 rev. 1 (1980-1981) (The expression “in
general” was introduced into the original text—in which it had not been
contemplated—at the IACtHR’s suggestion. The Commission reasoned
that it was necessary to reconcile existing differences among various
legal regimens regarding the legal protection of the nasciturus. However,
it is clear that Article 4.1 of the Convention, far from being a rule that
unequivocally entitles the nasciturus to the right to life, offers a far less
categorical protection.).
135 See generally Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13, ¶¶ 225243.
136 See generally id.
137 Id. ¶ 244.
134
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current living conditions.”138 This evolutive interpretation
entails a comparative law analysis on how other international
human rights jurisdictions have dealt with similar questions
and interpreted right to life provisions in the context of
IVF.139 Similarly, it also demands a comparative law analysis
on how countries have regulated IVF practices and what legal
status has been recognized for the embryo.140
With regard to the interpretation of the scope of the
right to life under IVF practices in other human rights
systems, the IACtHR analyzed several cases brought to the
European Court of Human Rights claiming the protection for
the embryos’ right to life and human dignity.141 In this
analysis, the IACtHR concluded that, in the European
Human Rights System, embryos were recognized with a
potential to develop into persons, but that such status did not
amount to recognition of a right to life or a “right to life of the
unborn child.”142 Similarly, for the purposes of the InterAmerican Human Rights System, non-implanted embryos
cannot be recognized as entitled to a right to life.
In relation to how IVF has been regulated and the legal
status awarded to the embryo in the Inter-American System
of Human Rights, the IACtHR concluded that, at the moment
of sentencing, most State Parties did not have specific
regulation on the matter.143 Notwithstanding this, Chile,
Brazil, and Perú had specific regulations stating that IVF
practice needed to be exercised solely with the intention to
	
  
	
  
Id. ¶ 245.
Id.
140 Id.
141 See generally id. ¶¶ 247-253.
142 Id. ¶ 252.
143 Id. ¶ 256.
138
139
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procreate.144 Brazil, in particular, has regulations establishing
that in order to protect the right to health of the individual
from supernumerary pregnancy, a maximum of four
embryos can be implanted in a uterus.145 Hence, the IACtHR
concluded that, since the IVF is permitted in all countries of
the Inter-American System except Costa Rica, IVF is
compatible with what is established in Article 4(1).146
4.   THE MOST FAVORABLE INTERPRETATION AND THE OBJECT
AND PURPOSE OF THE TREATY
Lastly, the IACtHR conducts a teleological
interpretation of Article 4(1) of the American Convention.147
Along its reasoning, the Court has found that there is an
obligation to protect a right to life, but the term “in general”
alludes to the possibility that in the event of a conflict
between rights, such protection should not be interpreted as
absolute.148 Contrary to what the Supreme Court of Costa
Rica has decided, an absolute protection of the right to life
cannot be possible under a most favorable interpretation
since it may lead to disproportionate limits on the human
rights of other affected individuals. Consequently, given that
the object and purpose of the American Convention is the
protection of every person’s human rights, the “broadest
protection” in favor of an absolute protection of the right to
life is contrary to the object of the Convention. Conversely,
the IACtHR has analyzed comparative constitutional case
law from State Parties to the Convention where a balancing
	
  
	
  
Id. ¶ 255.
Id.
146 Id. ¶ 256.
147 Id. ¶ 257.
148 Id. ¶ 258.
144
145
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between human rights in conflict was exercised.149 The
IACtHR concluded that the term “in general” in Article 4(1)
alludes to the requirement to practice a balancing reasoning
whenever there is a conflict between competing rights, that is,
the right to life of an embryo or unborn life and the human
rights of a woman.150
In conclusion, the Court’s doctrine in Artavia Murillo v.
Costa Rica determines that the non-implanted embryo is not a
subject of law protected under the right to life in Article 4(1)
and that any rights protection argument raised in defense of
embryos cannot be categorical, but rather must be balanced
with the affected rights of the woman or affected
individuals.151 Thus, Argentinean courts should adopt this
doctrine of the term “conception” when interpreting ARTs
practices and its consequences on the protection of the
human person as prescribed in the new Civil and Commerce
Code. With this conclusion in mind, decisions such as P., A. v.
S., A. C. or R., R. D. s/ medidas precautorias would be contrary
to the doctrine set by the IACtHR and Argentinean legal
order. Consequently, no protection of the law to the nonimplanted embryo could limit the right of individuals to form
a family, or to enforce legal parenthood on the individual
who refuses implantation of the embryo.
III.  

AN ARTAVIA MURILLO V. COSTA RICA READING OF
ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL AND COMMERCE CODE

As has been discussed above, Article 19 expresses that
the existence of the human person begins at the moment of
	
  
	
  
Id. ¶¶ 260-262.
Id. ¶ 258.
151 Id. ¶ 264.
149
150
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conception. The term “conception” has also been analyzed
under the interpretation of the IACtHR in Artavia Murillo v.
Costa Rica. In this sense, this section has so far argued that
under international human rights obligations, Argentinean
courts should follow the case law established by the IACtHR.
Notwithstanding this, how does the IACtHR’s finding in
Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica represent a different dialect of
rights from the other dialects dismissed as being based on
metaphysical or ontological understandings? Furthermore,
how can the IACtHR interpretation of the meaning and scope
of the right to life help harmonize Article 19 with the other
regulations on the protection of the human person, as
prescribed in the Civil and Commerce Code? Lastly, could
the reasoning of the IACtHR be interpreted as a critique that
spurs the need to draft when life begins into the Civil and
Commerce Code? Could the reasoning of the IACtHR give a
hint to the Argentinean legal tradition that what the law
should focus on is legal personhood and its effects on third
parties?
The IACtHR represents the most authoritative legal
institution in charge of defining the meaning and scope of the
lingua franca of human rights, accepted by most American
States, and instrumented through the American Convention
on Human Rights.152 As identified by the Court, the debate
on when life begins involves a great deal and many different
kinds of literature.153 In assessing this literature, the IACtHR
seems to conclude that scientific or legal literature
conceptualizing metaphysical or ontological attributes to
early stages of life development fails to give equal respect
	
  
	
  
Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, supra note 117, ¶ 185; P., A. c. S., A. C.
– L.L., supra note 65.
153 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, supra note 13, ¶ 185.
152
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and consideration to all other affected persons on the debate
of when life begins. In this sense, such literature should not
be considered a proper source for explaining when life begins
because it would entail the imposition of certain beliefs and
understandings of the world onto others who do not share
them.
But this is not the sole reason. The debate about when
life begins and its effects on the individual rights of others
does not occur in isolation. Rather, the Court points out, such
debate happens in a larger context, which is the developing
narrative of reproductive rights of individuals.154 To such
end, the Court has recognized that in determining the extent
of the right to life of embryos, the scope left for the enjoyment
of other recognized rights, such as the right to form a family
or not to become a legal parent, should also be given equal
consideration.155
For these reasons, a dialect of rights that gives equal
consideration and respect to all individuals that integrate the
Inter-American System of Human Rights must be aware of (i)
what other systems have said about when life begins and
how pre-natal life should be protected; (ii) how other systems
and countries have interpreted the right to life with regards
to ARTs in order to keep abreast of current lifestyles; and (iii)
how these systems and countries have balanced right to life
arguments for the protection of pre-natal life and other rights
in conflict. Hence, the dialect of rights used by the Court to
sustain the conclusion that the embryo should not be
considered a person with the protection of the right to life
reasonably accommodates, to some extent, the competing
interests in this debate. The rights of individuals to form a
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family, have access to IVF, or enjoy their right not to form a
family is reasonably protected, but also, as of the moment of
implantation, the Court recognizes that there may be legal
protections awarded to that prenatal life, provided that the
scope of such protection is balanced with the conflicting
rights of individuals.
This dialect chosen by the IACtHR for sustaining its
decision in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica may also be applied in
Argentina’s internal law for harmonizing the lack of legal
clarity embedded in the approved Article 19. In this sense, a
systematic interpretation of the regulation on the human
persons in the new Civil and Commerce Code demands that
the term “conception” be harmonized with Article 20. Under
this article, the Civil and Commerce Code determined the
period of conception, which runs between the maximum and
minimum periods of time set during a pregnancy.156
Furthermore, Article 21 of the Code establishes that the rights
and obligations of the “conceived” will be irrevocably
acquired, only if born with life.157 An interpretation of the
meaning of these articles means that there are potential rights
and obligations claims afforded to prenatal life during
pregnancy, but these rights and obligations become operative
only provided that successful birth occurs. Moreover, Article
20 specifically states that there cannot be conception without
pregnancy.158 Under this reading, conception must be
interpreted as the moment of implantation, since it is at this
moment when it is considered that pregnancy is achieved.159
This point clarifies that conception can exclusively occur in
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the uterus of an individual and, conversely, a non-implanted
embryo cannot be considered conceived.160
In addition to this, it is also important to pay attention
to other relevant regulations that are operative in Argentina.
Legislation enacted during 2013 prescribed regulations for
establishing a legal regime of ARTs in the country.161 Statute
No. 26.826, which prescribed integral access to assisted
reproductive techniques in Argentina, determined that
individuals who seek IVF treatments might revoke their
consent prior to the implantation of the embryo.162 This
statute also allows and commits the State to provide
cryopreservation of gametes and embryos to individuals who
seek ARTs at that moment or in the future.163 In light of this
new legal framework for ARTs, the non-implanted embryo
was recognized as having no legal value and, furthermore,
cryopreservation or donation of gametes for IVF purposes
were recognized as lawful practices.164
Finally, the legislative decision to enact a Civil and
Commerce Code that determines when life begins could be
further critiqued. In this sense, the IACtHR has accepted that
there is no definitive formula for determining when this
occurs.165 A Civil and Commerce Code should not prescribe
concepts such as “person” or “conception” on a biological,
metaphysical, or ontological understanding; on the contrary,
such concepts are normative concepts and, thus, should be
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defined in juridical terms.166 Thus, a Civil Code should define
when the Argentine legal system recognizes the legal status
of personhood to a being in order to determine rights and
obligations. In fact, a comparative private law analysis in the
Inter-American region shows that countries such as Colombia
or Brazil recognize that legal personhood begins at the
moment of birth with life, where rights and obligations are
acquired.167 In this sense, the Civil and Commerce Code of
Argentina could have dispensed the need to regulate when
life begins, and instead determined when legal personhood
begins as it has done in the current Article 21. Recognition of
legal personhood under these terms gives better legal clarity
to the private law legal order and avoids litigation claiming
the respect of Argentina’s international human rights
obligations.
IV.  

CONCLUSION

The new Civil and Commerce Code of Argentina has
managed to contemplate solutions or default rules for most
past and current contingencies that may arise in private law
relations in Argentina. Most importantly, the new Civil and
Commerce Code of Argentina includes Argentina’s
international human rights obligations as commitments that
shall also be respected by individuals when entering into
private law relations with one another. With this overarching
principle in mind, no doubt, the inclusion and regulation of
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ARTs in the Civil and Commerce Code of Argentina is a step
forward in the fulfillment of individual human rights.
Notwithstanding, this article studies how the new
private law governing legislation gestated and emerged in
the context of reproductive rights, particularly, the regulation
of ARTs. To this end, the article analyzed three moments in
time. As a preliminary step, it studied what informed the
drafters’ proposed regulation on ARTs. Such a study
involved identifying how the former Civil Code and the
jurisprudence structured the legal regime for access to and
practice of ARTs. Correspondingly, the article showed how
the draft of the new Civil and Commerce Code sketched by
the Commission of Jurists decided to propose a regulation in
response to past judicial interpretation that severely limited
access to ARTs. Lastly, this article shed light on the
consequences set out in the end result. Namely, this article
revealed that the current Civil and Commerce Code, to a
great extent, did not incorporate proposed regulations
drafted by the Commission of Jurists, and consequently left
the legal regime of ARTs under-regulated, with several legal
uncertainties, and with referrals for special legislation that
could severely restrict the universe of possible ART
treatments.
Throughout this analysis in time, this article disclosed
that during the formative process of the current Civil and
Commerce Code, different framings of “when human
personhood existence begins” were advocated, but all of
these were grounded in a language of rights. As was affirmed
throughout this article, the legislative decision to determine
when life begins brought about the discussion of at which
moments an organism can be awarded the legal status of
human personhood entitled to a right to life and the
protection of the law. Hence, the article has shown that some
groups that advocated for framings on this issue considered
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the embryo in all its developmental stages as a full human
person entitled to rights, while other groups did not consider
it to be a person at all. Most importantly, this debate in the
context of the Civil and Commerce Code reform was
sustained in the lingua franca of human rights, agreed in the
Inter-American Human Rights System, namely, the American
Convention on Human Rights. In response to this fact, this
piece has argued that a proper framing of such legal status
must not entail moral or ontological foundations that would
render the imposition of a belief or life plan on others.
Moreover, at the moment of framing such legal status, a
discourse for a certain framing based on the language of
rights must take into consideration the legal system in its
entirety and be able to keep abreast with current living
practices of individuals.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ decision in
Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica proves to be a legal solution
moving in the direction of solving the framing challenges
observed in the drafting of the Civil and Commerce Code.
Furthermore, and considering the legal uncertainties
embedded in the current Civil and Commerce Code with
regards to the legal regime of ARTs, this article has shown
that courts must interpret the text of the Code following the
Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica precedent. In fact, many predict
that this will occur because national courts have begun to
increase compliance with international human rights
regimes.168 However, as we suggested, this will necessarily be
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the case because the debates surrounding the beginning of
human legal personhood in Argentina are a reflection of the
fact that the lingua franca of the American Convention on
Human Rights has been invoked to defend both views.
With this challenge ahead, judges and lawyers, among
other equally important actors, may play, and have so far
played, an important role in continuing this debate. Thus, in
turn, this article calls for human rights lawyers and
reproductive rights advocates to take on the role of
reminding courts about the principles and values developed
in the case law of the Inter-American Courts, which is
fundamental.169
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